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OF FALSE TEETH AND BITING CRITIQUES:
JONES v. FISHER IN CONTEXT
Regina Austin*
A working knowledge of the critiques and resistance tactics of
ordinary workers can provide a powerful tool for challenging the
conventional wisdom that is at the core of the legal analysis
supporting their economic subordination. An analysis of Jones v.
Fisher,' a 1969 Wisconsin Supreme Court decision that I found in
the first-year torts book I once used,2 provides an excellent
illustration of the point. It demonstrates the usefulness of the
technique of critically placing legal conflicts in socio-economic
context with an eye toward discerning the various and competing
cultural perspectives of the litigants.
Contextual analysis of opinions is a variant of cultural studies.
Culture is a mechanism through which a community of people
organize and make sense of their lives against a backdrop of
material circumstances. Cultures with their socially derived and
therefore arbitrary conventions and habits are constantly in a state
of flux, responding to both internal and external forces. Cultural
studies explore the competition among and within cultures, with
particular attention being paid to the ways in which certain ideas
come to be accepted by some communities as common sense and
rejected by others as utter nonsense. Contextual/cultural studies,
then, would suggest that the reader of an opinion consider the
social, political, and economic status of the parties; the power
dynamic that exists among them; the identities of any parties
whose interests are being adjudicated without their participation
or representation; the impact of cultural and material conditions
in shaping the dispute; the role of individual agency, including
* OCopyright 1999 Regina Austin.
William A. Schnader Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania;
Visiting Professor, Brooklyn Law School. B.A., 1970, University of
Rochester; J.D., 1973, University of Pennsylvania.
'42 Wis. 2d 209, 166 N.W.2d 175 (1969).
2 PAGE KEETON, ROBERT KEETON, LEWIs D. SARGENTICH & HENRY J.
STEINER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT & AccIDENT LAw 36 (2d ed.
1989).
389
1
Austin: JONES V. FISHER
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1999
TOURO LAWREVIEW
organized political activism, in producing the conflict or possibly
resolving it; the sources of knowledge and information underlying
the parties' positions; the narrative and rhetorical tools each party
possesses; the way in which each party's position is constructed
as common sense or otherwise legitimated; and the impact of the
outcome on the social, economic, or political subordination or
domination of the competing parties.
The basis of the cause of action in Jones v. Fisher was assault
and battery. The contours of assault and battery vary with the
social context. An assault and battery arises when one makes
contact with the person of another with the intent to harm or the
intent to offend and/or without the other's consent.3 Offense is
gauged by the appropriateness of the touching given the time and
place. Consent may be implied from the circumstances as well.
Acts, silence, or inaction will suffice if such behavior would be
understood by a reasonable person as intended to indicate
permission. Moreover, "[i]n determining whether conduct would
be understood by a reasonable person as indicating consent, the
customs of the community are to be taken into account." 4 The
potential for cultural conflict, for dual readings of an interaction,
for alternative sightings of the operative norm are apparent in this
simple statement of doctrinal rules.
The social complexities of the tort of assault and battery are
revealed in an unusual way in Jones v. Fisher. Jerome and Clara
Belle Fisher, the defendants, were the owners of a nursing
home.' The plaintiff was Aleta Jones, a 26-year old woman who
entered the defendants' employ as a nurse's aid in December of
1966.6 Plaintiff's chores were somewhat domestic in nature.
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 (1983). This section provides:
(1) Consent is willingness in fact for conduct to occur, It may be
manifested by action or inaction and need not be communicated to
the actor. (2) If words or conduct are reasonably understood by
another to be intended as consent, they constitute apparent consent
and are as effective as consent in fact.
Id.
4 Id. at cmt. 9.
' Jones, 42 Wis. 2d at 212, 166 N.W.2d at 177.
6 id.
390 [Vol 15
2
Touro Law Review, Vol. 15 [1999], No. 2, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss2/6
JONES V FISHER
"She cared for the home residents during the night hours, set up
and gave medication, prepared and served breakfast and had
some clean-up duties in the kitchen." 7  The plaintiff and
defendants had a cordial and friendly relationship. The Fishers
regarded Mrs. Jones "as a good employee and were personally
fond of her." 8
In September of 1967, plaintiff was told by her dentist that she
needed dentures. 9 The Fishers voluntarily loaned her $200 to
apply toward her dental expenses.10 Shortly after obtaining the
dentures, plaintiff quit." When she went to collect her last pay
check, Mrs. Fisher attempted to convince her to return to work
for the Fishers, but plaintiff refused. 12 Then plaintiff and Mr.
Fisher discussed repayment of the loan. Plaintiff's offer to pay
off the debt at the rate of $20 per month was rejected by Mr.
Fisher who demanded that the loan be repaid in three days or that
the upper plate be left as security. 3 Plaintiff rejected these terms
and an argument ensued. When plaintiff attempted to run from
the room, Mr. Fisher grabbed her about the arms, grasped her
about the face, and extracted the false teeth from her mouth. 
4
"The affray [lasted] less than 15 minutes."" Mrs. Fisher went to
the police station and reported the incident. An officer went to
the nursing home, obtained the dentures, and returned them to
Mrs. Jones at the station. 
16
Mr. Fisher's forcible removal of the dentures caused Mrs.
Jones some pain to her arms and back and to her mouth which
was sensitive because the plate did not fit properly.17 The harm
Mrs. Jones suffered was largely psychological - the humiliation,
7id.
8id.
9 d. at 213, 166 N.W.2d at 177.
10 Id.
"Id.
12 id.
13 id.
14 id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 214, 166 N.W.2d at 177.
17 Id. at 213, 166 N.W.2d at 177.
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embarrassment, and shame of being attacked in the way in which
she was, of appearing in public without her teeth and having to
go to the police to get them retrieved. 18 Mrs. Jones, however,
did not go to the doctor or take any prescription medicines for her
upset. 9
A jury awarded Mrs. Jones $1,000 compensatory damages and
$5,000 punitive damages.20  The issue on appeal was not the
merits of the judgment in favor of Mrs. Jones but the amount of
the recovery.2 ' The Supreme Court of Wisconsin concluded that
Mrs. Jones had been given too much. It reduced the
compensatory damages to $500' and the punitive damages to
$2,000, 3 and ordered her to pay the costs of the appeal. 24
The majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the
compensatory damages were excessive. The assault took only a
few minutes and Mrs. Jones "was without her teeth for, at most,
an hour."' Moreover, "[h]er symptoms were all subjective and
not supported by any medical testimony nor any other
corroborating evidence." 26 (This conclusion, it should be noted,
may merely reflect the widely prevalent suspicion of claims for
emotional trauma not accompanied by physical injury or
manifested in overt physical suffering.) The majority had no
doubt that the Fishers' behavior was sufficiently "illegal,
outrageous and grossly unreasonable" to warrant the punishment
of an award of punitive damages. 7 That the defendants were
operating under the erroneous assumption that they were entitled
to take the teeth as security or collateral for their loan did not
excuse their conduct. The $5,000 punitive damages award,
however, represented a fifth of their yearly earnings and a
18 Id. at 214, 166 N.W.2d at 177-78.
19Id.
20 id.
21 Id. at 215, 166 N.W.2d at 178.
22 Id. at 218, 166 N.W.2d at 180.
23 Id. at 220, 166 N.W.2d at 181.
24 Id. at 222, 166 N.W.2d at 182.
2Id. at 216, 166 N.W.2d at 180.
26 Id.
27Id. at 219, 166 N.W.2d at 180.
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seventh of their net worth. Considering "the wealth of the
defendants, the character and extent of their acts, and the
probable motivation, and then applying the standard of
punishment and deterrence," $2,000 was a reasonable
assessment.2
The dissenting judge, who would have denied Mrs. Jones
punitive damages altogether was both blunt and sarcastic in
categorizing the altercation between Mrs. Jones and the Fishers.
In the view of the dissenter, the case involved an isolated incident
of a petty sort, "the most trivial of altercations and the mildest of
scuffles." 29 He likened the assault on Mrs. Jones to a "toupee-
snatching" and equated "the unpleasantness of an hour spent
without newly acquired dentures... [to] an hour spent without
the adornment of a substitute headpiece." 30  Compensatory
damages were therefore sufficient to deter the Fishers and others
from seizing dentures as security for an unpaid loan unless the
court was "dealing here with a propensity to grab, and hold upper
plates that is marked either by a high rate of recidivism or
contagion." 31  Mrs. Jones, for her part, was an ungrateful
employee who left the service of the Fishers with a $200 debt
undischarged. "The bicuspid corpus delicti [was] present only
because of an interest-free loan made by defendants to plaintiff"
on the expectation that she would remain in their employ. 32 The
loan thus bespoke "goodwill, not illwill." 33 "It was the lady's
decision, loan unpaid, to go to work for someone else that
precipitated a change in the relationship."3 The "flareup of
emotions, this shift in mood, this disappointment of expectations
on the part of the employing couple" which lead to the fracas
were neither wanton nor reckless and could not be the foundation
for an award of punitive damages.35
28 Id. at 220, 166 N.W.2d at 181.
29 Id. at 225, 166 N.W.2d at 184 (Hansen, J. dissenting).
301d. at 222, 166 N.W.2d at 182 (Hansen, J. dissenting).
31 Id. at 223-24, 166 N.W.2d at 183 (Hansen, J. dissenting).32Id. at 225, 166 N.W.2d at 183 (Hansen, J. dissenting).
33 Id. (Hansen, J. dissenting).
I Id. (Hansen, J. dissenting).35Id. (Hansen, J. dissenting).
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Today, we might see the opinion in Jones v. Fisher as
presenting another example of gender and possibly race bias in
the courts; the undervaluation of the pain and suffering
experienced by female and/or minority plaintiffs has been
documented and explained. Apart from any role that gender and
race may have played in the case, the judges' myopia almost
certainly had a basis in the widespread assumptions about the
proper roles of employers of domestic help and their servants.
It is possible to assess Mrs. Jones' claim from the perspective
of domestic workers, much like herself, who were engaged in
struggles, at roughly the same time, with their employers over the
right to greater respect and renumeration. In 1985, sociologist
Judith Rollins published a wonderful ethnographic study of the
relationship between black domestics and their white employers
that provides useful insights into the assault on Mrs. Jones. The
analysis that follows draws heavily on Rollins' book, Between
Woman: Domestics and Their Employers.36
The personal kindness and generosity the Fishers showed Mrs.
Jones were at least as instrumental and manipulative as they may
have been selfless and philanthropic. The Fishers were not
atypical employers of low-status help in that respect. The
psychological and emotional bond that existed between the
Fishers and Mrs. Jones reinforced the Fishers' superiority and
facilitated their economic exploitation of Mrs. Jones. This was a
relationship between people of unequal status. Given the nature
of the work, its situs, the prevalence of females as the principal
supervisor, and the significance women attach to personal
feelings and the quality of their relationships, it is not surprising
that domestics consider the treatment they receive from their
employers a significant aspect of the job. Female employers in
turn understand the power of emotional rewards and punishments
and use it as a mechanism for controlling domestic workers. In
extending themselves, the Fishers were attempting to solidify
their power over Mrs. Jones. They tried to capitalize on the
female bonding and to pull the emotional strings by having Mrs.
36 JUDITH ROLLINS, BETWEEN WOMEN: DOMESTICS AND THEIR EMPLOYERS
(1985).
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Fisher attempt to persuade Mrs. Jones to return to work.37 When
that effort failed, the male partner took control, the topic turned
to money, and the coercion became overt, physical, and violent. 31
The Fishers' use of force and violence should not have been
viewed as a response to acts of provocation and betrayal on the
part of Mrs. Jones, but to the frustration of the Fishers' sense of
mastery and domination over her person and their use of
prerogatives employers of domestics have long appropriated for
themselves. For example, under normal circumstances, there are
rules of spatial deference that keep the domestic employee at a
physical distance while privileging the employer to initiate bodily
contact with the employee.
The loan to Mrs. Jones was supposed to reinforce her economic
inequality and dependence on the Fishers and her subordinate
status. Of course, the court found nothing wrong with this and
gave the Fishers credit for being magnanimous and benevolent.
Instead of looking at the loan as charity, however, the court
might have considered it as being in lieu of a raise. There was no
reason to assume that Mrs. Jones did not earn what she got from
her employers. Mrs. Jones was perhaps too poor to pay for her
dentures without a loan from her employers because she was not
being paid enough; that she found employment elsewhere may
evidence that fact. The failure to seek medical attention and the
consequent absence of medical testimony to substantiate her
claims of distress may also be attributed to her limited income.
The loan was supposed to represent the Fishers' concern for
Mrs. Jones, and if Mrs. Jones was not really grateful she was
supposed to act that way by remaining in the Fishers' employ.
The court refused to recognize that Mrs. Jones' departure and the
subsequent assault on her person exposed these role expectations
to be pure fantasy. If the Fishers were truly concerned about her,
they would have been happy that she obtained a better job. It
must have been galling for the Fishers to have realized that their
loan made Mrs. Jones more nearly their equal. It gave her
leverage with which to bargain with them. Mrs. Jones turned her
37Jones, 42 Wis. 2d at 213, 166 N.W.2d at 177.
38M.
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loan that was supposed to solidify the Fishers' power over her
into a device for her own liberation. The Fishers' possessiveness
of Mrs. Jones extended beyond any ownership interest they
thought they had in her false teeth. They could not forcibly
reclaim the worker, so they did the next best thing; they forcibly
reclaimed her dentures.
The Fishers' behavior, then, was all too familiar to minority
women who performed domestic service work in homes of
various sorts. The court should have saved its pieties for more
deserving defendants and dealt with the systematic social and
economic realities that underlay the defendants' conduct.
The court gave no hint that Mrs. Jones' claim fit into a larger
context. There was no suggestion that her suit related to any
systematic wrong that should have triggered the common law's
concern with general deterrence. Unable or refusing to identify a
pattern of abuse or a category of claimants whose widely
experienced distress ought to be seen as possessing an aura of
objectivity, the court diminished and belittled plaintiff's suffering
as idiosyncratic, subjective, and inconsequential.
The very language the dissenter used went even further. The
dissent's rhetoric assured that the plaintiff's claim would not be
taken seriously. He treated the altercation as a laughable affair, a
bit of a lark, the stuff of bedroom comedies. What is there about
ill-fitting rugs and teeth in a jar that provokes such laughter? Is it
their associations with old age, or the loss of virility and sexiness,
or the bad luck of ill health and substandard medical care? Of
course, there is a world of difference between being deprived of
one's toupee and being deprived of one's false teeth. How could
the dissenter have counted on his readers failing to see the
difference? Though hair, fake or otherwise, is no laughing
matter to most black women who understand its relationship to
self-representation and confidence, a toupee is still largely
cosmetic. Though the loss of a toupee is likely to be
embarrassing, the loss of one's false teeth is likely to be far
worse. False teeth improve one's ability to speak and to eat.
Their absence causes the face to collapse and lose its contours.
In my limited experience, people without their false teeth tend to
garble their words or put their hands over their mouths. I suspect
396 [Vol 15
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a toothless person in a struggle with her'bosses is like a toothless
argument, "lacking in sharpness, or bite," "lacking the means of
enforcement or coercion: futile, ineffectual. " 39
Jones v. Fisher was decided in 1969. Some things have
changed since then but arguably not enough. Domestic workers
today are less likely to be native-born blacks and more likely to
be immigrants from Central and South America, the Near East,
the Indian subcontinent, and the Caribbean. The Civil Rights
Movement made it harder for white employers to treat black
female domestics as social inferiors, while at the same time it
opened up employment opportunities for black women in more
remunerative occupations. Domestic work is one of the fields in
which female immigrants, both legal and illegal, have secured a
niche. Much domestic work still occurs largely in the informal
economy where the requirements of the minimum wage law and
fair labor standards act do not prevail and social security taxes
are rarely paid and income taxes are rarely withheld.
Today's domestics are less politically empowered than the
black domestics of Mrs. Jones' time. The success of the movie
adaptations of the play "Driving Miss Daisy"40 and the novel
"Remains of the Day" 41 attest to the tenacity of the myth of the
generous master and the grateful/faithful servant. The knowledge
with which to challenge the myth exists, but it is no more
empowered than the workers themselves; they are in no position
to turn employer-saints into exploiter-villains or rebellious
servants into worker-heroes in the eyes of the law or the public.
Many of those who might give the critique greater visibility and
clout are operating under handicap. I do not think that it is unfair
to suggest that where domestic service work is concerned, the
cutting edge of some of the most progressive antiracist, pro-
feminist counterideologies may be dulled by self-interest.
Applying Rollins' critique to the Jones case may strike many
readers as harsh and unfair. People who have hired domestics
39 WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DIcrIONARY 2409 (Philip Babcock et
al. ed., 1993).
4°ALFRED UHRYS, DRVING Miss DAISY (1988).
41KAzou ISHIGURO, REMI iNS OF THE DAY (1989).
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and people who have benefited from their paid caregiving may
reject Rollins' challenge to the generosity of the gift giving that
domestics' employers do or the genuineness of the heartfelt
intimacy employers and domestic employees seemingly share.
Those with first-hand experience of the domestic employment
situation may doubt the intensity of the tensions Rollins describes
and suspect that she is simply putting her own gloss on the
relationship. Middle-class feminist professionals like myself who
are dependent on the assistance and loyalty of domestic workers
to maintain the home front while they pursue challenging, stress-
filled employment like men do, may not be the most objective
assessors or advocates of a pro-domestic critical world view.
Our deconstruction of doctrinal rubrics and attack on the
mechanisms by which they are manipulated to maintain existing
power relations may have worked too well. Our understanding of
knowledge and of power has been skewed in a way that has made
the insight linking the two the source of a conservative analysis.
It has doubled back on us and rendered our criticism impotent.
Our own inclusion in the camp of the oppressed privileges us to
employ the techniques of liberation on our own behalf. We
classify ourselves among those whose ordeals should be taken
account of when we advocate that the lived experience of
minority peoples be accorded the respectability of "knowledge."
We have lost sight of the fact that knowledge is a social product
or have equated the bourgeois experience of racism with the
whole. We do not always situate ourselves with reference to
other races, ethnicities, gender, or classes. In addition, there is
no basis for concluding that the lived experience of one person is
superior to that of another. Given their instrumental quality, our
claims of truth, merit, freedom, and even justice cannot help but
be suspect.
"Politics" can be a substitute for knowledge rather than
knowledge being a necessary tool in a program of transformative
politics. "Knowledge" can be abstracted from the social
practices of ordinary black people and become something that one
gains by being black and living a "political" existence within the
confines of one's institution or in the broader realm of the
profession. There is too little curiosity about the actual lives of
398 [Vol 15
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subordinated minority people, let alone systematic study.
Recognition that black people are not monolithic, of course,
would interfere with claims that we all speak with a different
"voice" or that the race or ethnicity of a scholar can make a work
of scholarship on the subject of white supremacy more
"authentic."
Legal scholars must return to the task of critical social inquiry.
The knowledge required for the practice of transformative politics
can only be acquired by an exploration of the neglected particular
so as to problematize for all what is now only a predicament for
some. There must be pragmatic engagement with those who
know material and social insecurity first hand. Both systems that
subjugate and the social and individual agents that cooperate in
producing that subjugation must be studied. At the same time,
the claims for the knowledge that is lived experience and narrow
political activity must give way to a bit of transcendent theorizing
and some immanent power accumulation.
1999 399
11
Austin: JONES V. FISHER
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1999
400 TOUROLAWREVIEW [Vol 15
12
Touro Law Review, Vol. 15 [1999], No. 2, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss2/6
